Baha'i Russian Connections

In the pre-Constitutional period, many in Iran seem also to have regarded the Russians as pro-Baha’i, an image that may have resulted from initial Russian activity on behalf of Baha’u’llah (as early as 1852–3); from Russia’s provision of a safe haven for Iranian Baha’is in the Caucasus and Transcaspia/Turkistan; or from its offer of sanctuary to Baha’is fleeing for their lives from the threat of mob violence. At any rate, it seems that a positive attitude towards Baha’is indeed existed in Russian circles, the main reason for this attitude being the view that the Baha’i faith represented a kind of reformist movement in Islam, which, as result of contacts with Christianity and European culture, had supposedly adopted some of their ideas. Thus it was, in general, viewed as ‘rather favourable to Christianity’, and therefore some regarded it as a possible means for propagating Russian Orthodoxy in Iran and other Islamic countries, in similar fashion to the American Presbyterian Church.

Thus, as the nineteenth century was coming to an end, Russian influence in Iran was rising and the Baha’i community in Ashgabat was booming. It could be that ‘Abdu’l-Baha thought that the time was advantageous for the Baha’is in Iran to continue the momentum that had just began in Ashgabat. After all, the Russian Transcaspian authorities were quite positive and liberal towards the local Baha’is, many of whom still maintained some kind of connection with Iran. As a person who had many followers in Iran, with some of them in the highest places, he was probably aware not only of the growing Russian influence in Iran, but also of the existence of such a school of thought in Russia, which held that the Baha’is could be used to pressure the Iranian government. After all, one member of that school, Baron Rozen, had maintained close and frequent contact with some of his former students, such as Tumanski and Ignatiev, who were collecting data and information on the Baha’is. In this occupation the two Russians maintained contact with many Baha’is, who would presumably have reported their dealings with these and other Russian officials to their leader, ‘Abdu’l-Baha. As far as Muzaffar al-Din Shah was concerned, it could be that having analysed the situation – namely the increase in Russian influence in Iran and the Russians’ positive attitude towards the Baha’is (as reflected in their treatment of the Baha’is of Ashgabat) – he might then have concluded that there was no point in creating a rift with the Russians over the Baha’is. He might have thought that giving the Baha’is such a concession as opening schools would not only help to meet a growing demand for modern schools in his country, but could also pull the rug from under the feet of those in Russia who might have played with the idea of using the Baha’is as a means of pressuring the Iranian government.

According to Shapour Rassekh, Iranian and Ottoman government officials respected ‘Abdu’l-Baha and consulted him on important matters. Given the advanced reformist thought of the Baha’i faith, it is very likely that at least some of these consultations touched upon the reform movement in both countries. Additionally, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, in a number of tablets, encouraged Baha’is to be constantly in touch with ‘important people’ in Iran, and seems himself to have written even to the supreme mujtahid of the Shi‘a world, Ayatullah Mirza Hasan Shirazi, who was residing in Samarra in Iraq.

Apart from good contacts and relations inside and outside Iran, one of the strong points of the Baha’is was their organization, which enabled Baha’u’llah and later ‘Abdu’l-Baha to ‘guide their flock’ from Acre. ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s contacts with the various Baha’i communities in Iran were maintained through what Tumanski described as ‘his secret agents’, who used three main routes for communications, two in the north and one in the south: Baku-Enzeli, Ashgabat-Mashhad, and Bombay – ports of the Persian Gulf. Generally speaking, the main regional points and junctions out of Iran for running this system of communication were Alexandria, Istanbul, Bombay, Baku and Ashgabat. It was this system, with its regional spread, organization, and contacts, which enabled Baha’is outside Iran to have their fingers on the pulse of their persecuted community within Iran, and to do whatever they could in order to help them, either directly by themselves or through enlisting the goodwill of foreign governments and their supporters in Iran and the region.

(The Forgotten Schools, The Baha’is and Modern Education in Iran, 1899–1934 by Soli Shahvar)