Learning from the analysis of the pattern of resignations from the Faith

Following an earlier analysis of the pattern of resignations from the Faith, a shared learning process has advanced on the spiritual tests that lead to individuals distancing themselves from the Faith. Analysis of the results of a survey of Local Assemblies and Auxiliary Board members is currently being distilled, with the purpose of identifying how local communities can be assisted to identify the early signs and respond in a timely and appropriate manner.

(National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of Australia Incorporated - Annual Report for 181 B.E.)

National_Spiritual_Assembly_Annual_Report_181_BE_singles

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Dr. Abbas Milani about Baha'is and Gays in Iran during Shah's regime

Abbas Milani argues that while the Shah's regime restricted direct political criticism, it provided a level of cultural and social freedom for marginalized groups that was unprecedented in Iranian history.

Regarding Baha'is, Milani states:

• They enjoyed more freedom under the Shah than ever before or since.
• He emphasizes that the Iranian Baha'i community lived a "better life" during this period compared to both the times preceding the Shah and the era of the Islamic Republic.

Regarding Gays, Milani highlights several indicators of social tolerance:

• Gay Marriage: He notes that a gay marriage took place in Iran in 1975, involving a carriage covered in flowers and a participant who was "very close to the court of the Shah". The individual involved was neither dismissed from the court nor punished.
• Social Spaces: He mentions the existence of a gay bar during that time.
• The Queen's Intervention: Milani recounts an incident from American archives where the police attempted to harass patrons at a gay bar. Upon hearing of this, the Queen (Empress Farah Pahlavi) intervened with the Shah, asking, "What kind of a brutality is this these people are in a bar enjoying theirelves Let them have their [fun]".

Milani's broader argument is that these types of freedoms—for Baha'is, the LGBTQ+ community, women, and Jews—are as essential to a democratic society as the right to engage in political dissent or organize Marxist groups. He suggests that in retrospect, the right of these groups to live in freedom was just as important as the academic freedom he sought as a young Marxist.

(Unpacking Iran: A Conversation with Dr. Abbas Milani - The Chicago Forum for Free Inquiry and Expression)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xSVhjqAv1WY

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no Bahá’í work may be published without approval

Although no Bahá’í work may be published without approval, it is not mandatory to print an approval notice in any publication.

(Publishing, Bahá'í, Memorandum on: Materials to be Deposited with the Bahá'í World Centre Library, Bahá'í International Archives, Universal House of Justice 1998/2000)

https://bahai-library.com/bwc_memorandum_bahai_publishing

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Baha'is have undertaken to reform the Shí’ite sect

Abduh Says:

He [Abdul Baha] only explained that they have undertaken to reform the Shí’ite sect and bring it closer to the Sunnís... They are the sect most in need of reform.

(Muḥammad ‘Abduh and Rashíd Riḍá: A Dialogue on the Bahá’í Faith, Translation by Juan R. Cole)

https://bahai.works/World_Order/Series2/Volume_15/Issue_3_4/Text

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To Horace’s mind, logic dictated that the door to a future Guardian was closed.

Waiting until the Universal House of Justice was elected seemed too distant during a period fraught with During the Conclave, the Hands had concluded from their study of authoritative texts that only the Universal House of Justice could make a definitive statement about the future of the Guardianship, and, as of 1957, a date had not been fixed for the establishment of the House of Justice. To Horace’s mind, logic dictated that the door to a future Guardian was closed. He believed the conditions set forth in the Will and Testament of ‘Abdu’l-Baha could no longer be met. The Will had been widely disseminated for decades, making it possible for all Baha'is to study it and draw conclusions, as he had. Concerned by various reports brought to its attention, the National Spiritual Assembly of the United States encouraged the Hands living in America to draft a statement to explain why there could not be another Guardian. Horace produced a draft in consultation with Paul Haney and the National Assembly, giving it the title ‘A New Baha'i Era’. It opened by declaring that, since the passing of Shoghi Effendi, “The landscape has changed; in some aspects it is unfamiliar; we pause in temporary confusion until we become accustomed to the new condition and can see its relationship to the eternal verities of the revelation we have accepted with all our hearts.’’ As this statement circulated, segments of it were sent to the Custodians in the Holy Land who immediately became alarmed, because they thought it interpreted the Proclamation issued by the Conclave. They cabled the American Hands to delete several sentences, specifically the ones stating that the door to another Guardian was closed and that the Custodians had the authority to expel individuals from the Faith. Horace responded quickly, asking his colleagues in Haifa to consider the full statement, not just the excerpts. After studying the document, the Custodians firmly insisted that ‘A New Baha’i Era’ be removed from circulation at once and the matter dropped. Horace was shocked, not only because he believed the statement was a necessary prophylactic, but because he felt the Custodians were censoring believers who were making determinations based upon their own reading of ‘Abdu'l-Baha’s Will and Testament. He wrote them a frank letter, begging them to reconsider. The response he received showed that the Custodians had a broader view than the Hands serving in the field. Their concern was not the accuracy of the statement, but the wisdom of promulgating it. They wanted the crucial matter of the future of the Guardianship to be addressed with one voice taking into consideration how the message would be understood globally.

(Infinite Horizons - The Life and Times of Horace Holley by Kathryn Jewett Hogenson)

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Ira Lapidus, the American historian, also holds the view that the Russians supported the Baha’is.

Ira Lapidus, the American historian, also holds the view that the Russians supported the Baha’is. Although he does not provide evidence for this view, he claims that Russian support of the Baha’is was one of the reasons for the pre-Constitutional protests in the bazaars; see Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 475.

(The Forgotten Schools, The Baha’is and Modern Education in Iran, 1899–1934 by Soli Shahvar)

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Baha'i Russian Connections

In the pre-Constitutional period, many in Iran seem also to have regarded the Russians as pro-Baha’i, an image that may have resulted from initial Russian activity on behalf of Baha’u’llah (as early as 1852–3); from Russia’s provision of a safe haven for Iranian Baha’is in the Caucasus and Transcaspia/Turkistan; or from its offer of sanctuary to Baha’is fleeing for their lives from the threat of mob violence. At any rate, it seems that a positive attitude towards Baha’is indeed existed in Russian circles, the main reason for this attitude being the view that the Baha’i faith represented a kind of reformist movement in Islam, which, as result of contacts with Christianity and European culture, had supposedly adopted some of their ideas. Thus it was, in general, viewed as ‘rather favourable to Christianity’, and therefore some regarded it as a possible means for propagating Russian Orthodoxy in Iran and other Islamic countries, in similar fashion to the American Presbyterian Church.

Thus, as the nineteenth century was coming to an end, Russian influence in Iran was rising and the Baha’i community in Ashgabat was booming. It could be that ‘Abdu’l-Baha thought that the time was advantageous for the Baha’is in Iran to continue the momentum that had just began in Ashgabat. After all, the Russian Transcaspian authorities were quite positive and liberal towards the local Baha’is, many of whom still maintained some kind of connection with Iran. As a person who had many followers in Iran, with some of them in the highest places, he was probably aware not only of the growing Russian influence in Iran, but also of the existence of such a school of thought in Russia, which held that the Baha’is could be used to pressure the Iranian government. After all, one member of that school, Baron Rozen, had maintained close and frequent contact with some of his former students, such as Tumanski and Ignatiev, who were collecting data and information on the Baha’is. In this occupation the two Russians maintained contact with many Baha’is, who would presumably have reported their dealings with these and other Russian officials to their leader, ‘Abdu’l-Baha. As far as Muzaffar al-Din Shah was concerned, it could be that having analysed the situation – namely the increase in Russian influence in Iran and the Russians’ positive attitude towards the Baha’is (as reflected in their treatment of the Baha’is of Ashgabat) – he might then have concluded that there was no point in creating a rift with the Russians over the Baha’is. He might have thought that giving the Baha’is such a concession as opening schools would not only help to meet a growing demand for modern schools in his country, but could also pull the rug from under the feet of those in Russia who might have played with the idea of using the Baha’is as a means of pressuring the Iranian government.

According to Shapour Rassekh, Iranian and Ottoman government officials respected ‘Abdu’l-Baha and consulted him on important matters. Given the advanced reformist thought of the Baha’i faith, it is very likely that at least some of these consultations touched upon the reform movement in both countries. Additionally, ‘Abdu’l-Baha, in a number of tablets, encouraged Baha’is to be constantly in touch with ‘important people’ in Iran, and seems himself to have written even to the supreme mujtahid of the Shi‘a world, Ayatullah Mirza Hasan Shirazi, who was residing in Samarra in Iraq.

Apart from good contacts and relations inside and outside Iran, one of the strong points of the Baha’is was their organization, which enabled Baha’u’llah and later ‘Abdu’l-Baha to ‘guide their flock’ from Acre. ‘Abdu’l-Baha’s contacts with the various Baha’i communities in Iran were maintained through what Tumanski described as ‘his secret agents’, who used three main routes for communications, two in the north and one in the south: Baku-Enzeli, Ashgabat-Mashhad, and Bombay – ports of the Persian Gulf. Generally speaking, the main regional points and junctions out of Iran for running this system of communication were Alexandria, Istanbul, Bombay, Baku and Ashgabat. It was this system, with its regional spread, organization, and contacts, which enabled Baha’is outside Iran to have their fingers on the pulse of their persecuted community within Iran, and to do whatever they could in order to help them, either directly by themselves or through enlisting the goodwill of foreign governments and their supporters in Iran and the region.

(The Forgotten Schools, The Baha’is and Modern Education in Iran, 1899–1934 by Soli Shahvar)

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Bahá’í opposition to Shi‘ism and the Shi‘i clergy.

A final reason for anti-Bahá’í attitudes, although rarely stated, must be Bahá’í opposition to Shi‘ism and the Shi‘i clergy. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi were often scathing on these subjects, calling the Shi‘is “the most wretched of sects” [Ma’ida-yi Asmani (Tehran, 1971-3) vol. 7, p. 182.] and its leaders “false, cruel and cowardly,” [Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day Is Come (Wilmette, 1939) pp. 93-98] hardly attitudes likely to endear the Bahá’ís to the religious establishment. Even if such harsh assessments may have been modified in the more tolerant paths the Bahá’ís have more recently trod they will not have been forgotten by the clergy, even if not publicly expressed.

(Bahá’í News, December 1982, Bahá’í Year 139, ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report)

https://bahai.works/Bahá’í_News/Issue_621/Text

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Bahá’ís actually cooperated with the Pahlavis?

...there is evidence that some prominent beneficiaries of the regime were Bahá’ís or had strong Bahá’í connections. The Shah’s personal physician and close confidant, for example, was a Bahá’í, General Ayadi, who was commonly believed to have used his position to advance his co-religionists. Hojabr Yazdani, a rich Bahá’í financier with a reputation for questionable business dealings, became extremely unpopular, and the banks he controlled were special targets in the 1978 riots. The long-serving prime minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda had a Bahá’í father (who was expelled from the community) and was therefore considered by many Iranians to be a Bahá’í or at least to favor Bahá’ís, even though he considered himself a Muslim.

(Bahá’í News, December 1982, Bahá’í Year 139, ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report)

https://bahai.works/Bahá’í_News/Issue_621/Text

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Can Baha'is be considered a political group?

Participation in partisan politics is certainly not permitted among Bahá’ís, and anyone breaking this rule is liable to expulsion. Put differently, anyone participating in politics would have ceased to be a practicing Bahá’í by so doing.

Nevertheless, Bahá’ís cannot claim to be completely uninvolved in politics. They believe, after all, that the present world order is doomed and will one day be replaced by their faith. Islam generally, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of it in particular, make no clear distinction between religion and politics, and the same can be said for the Bahá’í faith.

The Bahá’ís also have specific views on what most people call political questions. Dr. Denis MacEoin has pointed out that Bahá’ís are opposed to communism and socialism, and have adopted clear positions on such issues as racism, nationalism and world government. In several cases, such as their attitude toward communism, their views coincide with those of the orthodox clergy in Iran, but there is one major difference. Bahá’í texts refer to divinely sanctioned monarchy, and it is clear that this is the form of government they prefer.

Despite the ill-treatment Bábís received from Qajar autocrats, Bahá’í leaders from Bahá’u’lláh onwards were rarely critical of the institution of monarchy, or even autocracy. They took no part in the Constitutional Revolution, for example, and described Mohammad Ali Shah, who tried to overthrow the Constitution, as a “just king.” Bahá’ís apparently said prayers for Mohammad Reza Shah during the 1978-79 Revolution. The Shi‘i clergy, by contrast, were in the main opposed to both the Qajar and Pahlavi regimes, and believe that monarchy is by definition unjust.

(Bahá’í News, December 1982, Bahá’í Year 139, ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report)

https://bahai.works/Bahá’í_News/Issue_621/Text

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To Muslims, Baha'is are cancer that must be cut out. Reminds me of the covenant-breakers who are cancer for the Baha'is

They [Baha'is] represent a cancer that must be cut out before it can infect the rest of the body.

[...]

Shi‘a Islam regards itself as a minority faith born of repression and injustice, yet sees nothing wrong in applying such standards, on the rare occasions when it has been in a position to do so, to minority faiths it views as dangerous.

(Bahá’í News, December 1982, Bahá’í Year 139, ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report)

https://bahai.works/Bahá’í_News/Issue_621/Text

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Khomeini favors religious freedom for everyone except the Baha'i

Khomeini's statements on individual rights, like many of his statements, sometimes seem progressive, but they can be misleading. He asserts that "woman is equal to man. Like him she is free to choose her destiny and activities." The freedom he would grant to women, however, is the freedom to be "moral." He opposes coeducation because, he claims, it undermines the family, and he favors the veiling of women to avoid temptation. He says he favors religious freedom for everyone except the Baha'i, who are considered heretics by most Muslims and pro-Shah by Khomeini.

(CIA Reading Room 01478463: RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI - IRAN by CIA Reading Room)

https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01478463

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Amir Abbas Hoveyda has long been rumored to be a Baha'i

On Saturday, the Shah accepted the resignation of Minister of Court Amir Abas Hoveyda. Hoveyda has long been a close adviser to the throne and was prime minister from 1965 to 1977. He has long been rumored to be a Bahai, a sect strongly denounced by Muslim leaders, and his ouster could be another conciliatory gesture by the Shah toward at least his moderate opponents within Muslim ranks.

(CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79t00975a030800010070-2: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN)

https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79t00975a030800010070-2

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Rewriting history

Totalitarian governments often rewrite history and delete as non-persons those they do not like; I should hope that Bahá’í historians will be more honest.

-Juan R. Cole

https://bahai.works/World_Order/Series2/Volume_16/Issue_4/Text

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Columbia’s Baha’i Club Is Small but Dedicated!

On paper, there are 40 or so members; anywhere from 3 to 10 people usually attend meetings.

(Columbia News, December 02, 2025)

https://news.columbia.edu/news/columbias-bahai-club-small-dedicated

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