As of 11 June 2026, 63 Bahá'ís are detained across Iran

As of 11 June 2026, 63 Bahá'ís (35 women, 28 men) are detained across Iran...

https://iranwire.com/en/features/153616-63-bahais-detained-across-iran-solely-for-their-beliefs/

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Main actors during the Constitutional Revolution were Baha'is not Azalis according to Moojan Momen.

It is the thesis of this paper that the evidence presented demonstrates that the main actors in this period [Constitutional Revolution, 1883–1906] were not Azalí Bábís as is usually stated but were either Bahá’ís or persons actively engaged with the Bahá’í community.

(The Reform Movement in Isfahan, Iran: The Role of Bábís and Bahá’ís by Moojan Momen)

https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/17/6/717

The Constitutional Revolution was a nationalist and religious movement that arose in response to European interference in Iran's internal affairs. According to Mongol Bayat, it was led by a coalition of patriots, merchants & religious leaders, its primary goal was to replace the arbitrary rule of the Qajar monarchy with a representative government and the rule of law. This struggle eventually led to the establishment of the first Iranian parliament known as the Majles, and the promulgation of a national constitution in 1906.

Azalis contributed to the revolution by acting as secret religious dissidents who shifted their focus from doctrinal reforms to a broader political struggle for national liberation. To avoid persecution and gain public trust, they often practiced Taqiyya (Dissimulation) to hide their true identity while wearing traditional clerical turbans and garb. Key Azali figures and their networks were instrumental in forming secret societies, mobilizing religious students and distributing revolutionary literature that pushed high ranking religious leaders into action.

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the Guardian not only deprived anyone who did not openly declare his Faith of his voting rights, but even indicated they were Covenant breakers.

"In Persia, even during the period of persecution, when life was in danger, and complete freedom offered to those who indicated they were Muslims and not Bahá’ís, the Guardian not only deprived anyone who did not openly declare his Faith of his voting rights, but even indicated they were Covenant breakers.

"Thus you will see that it is completely inconsistent for a Bahá’í under any circumstances whatsoever, to indicate they are anything but a Bahá’í, regardless of what the result may be."

(From a letter written on behalf of Shoghi Effendi to two believers, April 30, 1957)

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Mulla Husayn failed in Qum because there were no Shaykhi elements there

In Isfahan, during the first stage of his mission, Mulla Husayn succeeded in converting a number of favorable Shaykhi elements. As in Shiraz, his public preachings drew attention from prominent 'ulama and in due course led to their mild condemnation. En route to Tehran, Mulla Husayn stopped in Kashan, where he attracted a number of Shaykhi sympathizers and called upon a celebrated mujtahid. He then proceeded to Qum, where according to Nabil Zarandi “he found the people utterly unprepared to heed his call,” perhaps due to the absence of any Shaykhi connection there.

(Resurrection and Renewal - The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 844-850 by Abbas Amanat, p. 261)

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In the beginning the Baha'i faith permitted converts to maintain participation in their birth religion and thus not fully break with their communities.

...as pressures to convert to Islam diminished, and some economic success was achieved, the Zoroastrian community faced more challenges. One was the rise of Bahaism. Bahaism, founded in mid‑nineteenth‑century Iran, promoted equality, repudiated the concept of non‑Muslims as polluting, and permitted converts to maintain participation in their birth religion and thus not fully break with their communities. There were intra‑marrying Zoroastrian Baha’is, Jewish Baha’is, and Muslim Baha’is (Kestenberg Amighi 2022: 142). However, conversions to the Baha’i religion reduced the small Zoroastrian population by some 4,000 people (Maneck 1991: 1) and caused fierce rifts between Zoroastrian traditionalists who saw the Baha’is as a threat, and reform‑minded Zoroastrians and Parsis who believed that the Baha’is were laying a foundation for the liberalisation of Iran. The conflict grew so intense that, in 1915, a pro‑Baha’i Zoroastrian in Yazd, educator Master Khodabakhsh, was murdered (Kestenberg Amighi 1990: 166), and like‑minded Ostad (‘teacher’) Keyomarz was warned to flee Iran (Fischer 1973: 108 fn1). According to one theory, it was the conservative Zoroastrian organisation, Yazd Right Followers, which was responsible for the murder and threats (Dadbakhsh and Moftakhri 2018: 4–5).

(ZOROASTRIAN POLITICS IN THE ERA OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN IRAN
(1905–1911) by Janet Kestenberg Amighi)

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Some of Iran’s most innovative and successful industrialists, engineers, architects, and artists were either Jewish or Baha’i.

The Shah’s crucial decade from 1965 to 1975 was also critical for the regime’s cultural politics. Iran in this period was a discordant combination of cultural freedoms and political despotism—of increasing censorship against the opposition but increasing freedoms for everyone else....

Much to the consternation of the Shiite clergy in this period, the Baha’i enjoyed freedom and virtual equality with other citizens. The same was true about Iranian Jews—some 100,000 of them, who had lived in Iran for over 3,000 years. In the words of David Menasheri, it was the Jews’ “golden age,” wherein they enjoyed equality with Muslims and in terms of their per capita incomes “they might have been the richest Jewish community in the world.” Some of Iran’s most innovative and successful industrialists, engineers, architects, and artists were either Jewish or Baha’i. The Arjomand family, dominant in the production of home appliances in Iran; the Sabet family, who brought television and Pepsi to the country; and finally Habib Elghanian, who introduced the nation to the magic of “plastic,” were all members of the Baha’i and Jewish faiths. The Shah’s private physician, Dr. Ayadi, was an active member of the Baha’i faith and was instrumental in facilitating Baha’i security and prosperity in Iran.

(The Shah by Milani, Abbas)

https://archive.org/details/shah0000mila

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In 2014, the husband converted to Twelver Shi‘i Islam, while the wife remained a follower of the Baha’i religion.

In 2020, a civil lawsuit seeking the dissolution of a marriage (infisakh-i nikah) was filed before a family court in Tehran. The parties, a man and a woman, had married in 2003, both adhering at the time to the Baha’i faith, a religion unrecognized under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 2014, the husband converted to Twelver Shi‘i Islam, while the wife remained a follower of the Baha’i religion.

Initially, the husband filed a claim for annulment of the marriage, arguing that their religious divergence rendered continuation of the marital relationship impossible. The family court rejected this claim, stating that the grounds for annulment (batiliyat-i nikah) are narrowly enumerated in the Iranian Civil Code (Qanun-i Madani-yi Iran), and that conversion of one spouse alone does not constitute a valid basis for annulment.

(Equality, Plurality and Personal Status Laws A Research Companion Edited by Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Baudouin Dupret, Jean-Louis Halpérin, Radhika Kanchana, Ayang Utriza Yakin and Zohra Aziadé Zemirli)

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Baha'i is a cult in Iran. Examining the Human Rights of Baha'is in Iran (Official Source)

In Iran, akin to many nations globally, the acknowledgment of sectarian tendencies as independent religions is not typically recognized. However, adherents of various sects, including the Bahá’í sect, are permitted to freely practice their ceremonies and rituals within the legal framework, availing themselves of the rights and privileges of citizenship. The Islamic Republic of Iran adopts a stance that generally does not draw a distinction between Bahá’ís and non-Bahá'ís. Both groups are deemed to possess equal rights, enjoying the full spectrum of rights accorded to all members of society. Services provided within Iran are not contingent upon individuals’ beliefs, and fundamentally, there exists no mechanism established to officially recognize or highlight these religious differences among citizens. Therefore, Bahá’ís possess a range of civil, cultural, social, and economic rights, encompassing ownership of factories, companies, and pharmacies, unrestricted ownership, receipt of subsidies, access to private cemeteries for interment in accordance with their beliefs, entitlement to various types of basic and supplementary insurances, as well as unhindered access to law enforcement and judicial services. They also have the opportunity for ongoing education, issuance of a national identification card, extensive utilization of cyberspace through websites and pages, acquisition of driver’s licenses, reception of the COVID-19 vaccine, participation in multiple trade unions, engagement in importation of goods, involvement in agricultural practices, animal husbandry, horticulture, and marriage, as well as utilization of sports halls and complexes.

(Unveiling Human Rights Perspectives: A Comprehensive Examination of the Baha’i Sect, Published by The High Council for Human Rights of The Islamic Republic of Iran, December 2023)

https://milan.mfa.gov.ir/files/enMilan/Bultan/گزارش%20بهاییت%20انگلیسی.pdf

Other side of the story:

After the 1979 Revolution, Baha'is in Iran are denied fundamental rights because they are not recognized as a religious minority under Article 13 of the Constitution. This lack of legal status leaves them without an autonomous personal status code, forcing them to follow Shi‘i jurisprudence, which leads to the state's refusal to register Baha'i marriages or issue birth certificates recognizing their faith. Baha'is also face systematic discrimination in inheritance, where the legal principle of nafy al-sabil and Article 881 bis of the Civil Code are used to transfer their property to distant Muslim relatives, effectively disinheriting Baha'i families. Crucially, Iranian courts may also refuse to validate Baha'i wills that include bequests to religious centers located in Israel, as such actions are deemed contrary to the state’s political interests and public policy. These systematic legal deficiencies deny the community equal protection under the law and violate Iran's international obligations under the ICCPR to respect the culture and religious practices of minorities.

(Equality, Plurality and Personal Status Laws A Research Companion Edited by Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, Baudouin Dupret, Jean-Louis Halpérin, Radhika Kanchana, Ayang Utriza Yakin and Zohra Aziadé Zemirli)

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Dr. Abbas Milani about Baha'is and Gays in Iran during Shah's regime

Abbas Milani argues that while the Shah's regime restricted direct political criticism, it provided a level of cultural and social freedom for marginalized groups that was unprecedented in Iranian history.

Regarding Baha'is, Milani states:

• They enjoyed more freedom under the Shah than ever before or since.
• He emphasizes that the Iranian Baha'i community lived a "better life" during this period compared to both the times preceding the Shah and the era of the Islamic Republic.

Regarding Gays, Milani highlights several indicators of social tolerance:

• Gay Marriage: He notes that a gay marriage took place in Iran in 1975, involving a carriage covered in flowers and a participant who was "very close to the court of the Shah". The individual involved was neither dismissed from the court nor punished.
• Social Spaces: He mentions the existence of a gay bar during that time.
• The Queen's Intervention: Milani recounts an incident from American archives where the police attempted to harass patrons at a gay bar. Upon hearing of this, the Queen (Empress Farah Pahlavi) intervened with the Shah, asking, "What kind of a brutality is this these people are in a bar enjoying theirelves Let them have their [fun]".

Milani's broader argument is that these types of freedoms—for Baha'is, the LGBTQ+ community, women, and Jews—are as essential to a democratic society as the right to engage in political dissent or organize Marxist groups. He suggests that in retrospect, the right of these groups to live in freedom was just as important as the academic freedom he sought as a young Marxist.

(Unpacking Iran: A Conversation with Dr. Abbas Milani - The Chicago Forum for Free Inquiry and Expression)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xSVhjqAv1WY

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Bahá’í opposition to Shi‘ism and the Shi‘i clergy.

A final reason for anti-Bahá’í attitudes, although rarely stated, must be Bahá’í opposition to Shi‘ism and the Shi‘i clergy. ‘Abdu’l-Bahá and Shoghi Effendi were often scathing on these subjects, calling the Shi‘is “the most wretched of sects” [Ma’ida-yi Asmani (Tehran, 1971-3) vol. 7, p. 182.] and its leaders “false, cruel and cowardly,” [Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day Is Come (Wilmette, 1939) pp. 93-98] hardly attitudes likely to endear the Bahá’ís to the religious establishment. Even if such harsh assessments may have been modified in the more tolerant paths the Bahá’ís have more recently trod they will not have been forgotten by the clergy, even if not publicly expressed.

(Bahá’í News, December 1982, Bahá’í Year 139, ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report)

https://bahai.works/Bahá’í_News/Issue_621/Text

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Bahá’ís actually cooperated with the Pahlavis?

...there is evidence that some prominent beneficiaries of the regime were Bahá’ís or had strong Bahá’í connections. The Shah’s personal physician and close confidant, for example, was a Bahá’í, General Ayadi, who was commonly believed to have used his position to advance his co-religionists. Hojabr Yazdani, a rich Bahá’í financier with a reputation for questionable business dealings, became extremely unpopular, and the banks he controlled were special targets in the 1978 riots. The long-serving prime minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda had a Bahá’í father (who was expelled from the community) and was therefore considered by many Iranians to be a Bahá’í or at least to favor Bahá’ís, even though he considered himself a Muslim.

(Bahá’í News, December 1982, Bahá’í Year 139, ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report)

https://bahai.works/Bahá’í_News/Issue_621/Text

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Can Baha'is be considered a political group?

Participation in partisan politics is certainly not permitted among Bahá’ís, and anyone breaking this rule is liable to expulsion. Put differently, anyone participating in politics would have ceased to be a practicing Bahá’í by so doing.

Nevertheless, Bahá’ís cannot claim to be completely uninvolved in politics. They believe, after all, that the present world order is doomed and will one day be replaced by their faith. Islam generally, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of it in particular, make no clear distinction between religion and politics, and the same can be said for the Bahá’í faith.

The Bahá’ís also have specific views on what most people call political questions. Dr. Denis MacEoin has pointed out that Bahá’ís are opposed to communism and socialism, and have adopted clear positions on such issues as racism, nationalism and world government. In several cases, such as their attitude toward communism, their views coincide with those of the orthodox clergy in Iran, but there is one major difference. Bahá’í texts refer to divinely sanctioned monarchy, and it is clear that this is the form of government they prefer.

Despite the ill-treatment Bábís received from Qajar autocrats, Bahá’í leaders from Bahá’u’lláh onwards were rarely critical of the institution of monarchy, or even autocracy. They took no part in the Constitutional Revolution, for example, and described Mohammad Ali Shah, who tried to overthrow the Constitution, as a “just king.” Bahá’ís apparently said prayers for Mohammad Reza Shah during the 1978-79 Revolution. The Shi‘i clergy, by contrast, were in the main opposed to both the Qajar and Pahlavi regimes, and believe that monarchy is by definition unjust.

(Bahá’í News, December 1982, Bahá’í Year 139, ‘The Bahá’ís of Iran’: A special report)

https://bahai.works/Bahá’í_News/Issue_621/Text

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Khomeini favors religious freedom for everyone except the Baha'i

Khomeini's statements on individual rights, like many of his statements, sometimes seem progressive, but they can be misleading. He asserts that "woman is equal to man. Like him she is free to choose her destiny and activities." The freedom he would grant to women, however, is the freedom to be "moral." He opposes coeducation because, he claims, it undermines the family, and he favors the veiling of women to avoid temptation. He says he favors religious freedom for everyone except the Baha'i, who are considered heretics by most Muslims and pro-Shah by Khomeini.

(CIA Reading Room 01478463: RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI - IRAN by CIA Reading Room)

https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01478463

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Amir Abbas Hoveyda has long been rumored to be a Baha'i

On Saturday, the Shah accepted the resignation of Minister of Court Amir Abas Hoveyda. Hoveyda has long been a close adviser to the throne and was prime minister from 1965 to 1977. He has long been rumored to be a Bahai, a sect strongly denounced by Muslim leaders, and his ouster could be another conciliatory gesture by the Shah toward at least his moderate opponents within Muslim ranks.

(CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79t00975a030800010070-2: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN)

https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79t00975a030800010070-2

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During the Shah's regime Baha'i enjoyed prominent social status, including advanced military posts and involvement in governmental affairs.

The return of the Shah to power, following Mossadeq’s brief rule, empowered secular elements of Iranian society. Iranian society enjoyed many of the features of western society including theater, restaurants, entertainment centers, which operated as central aspects of the citizens’ lifestyle. During this period, the Jewish community, although a small minority, enjoyed substantial influence. In addition, the Baha’i community, a slightly larger minority, enjoyed prominent social status, including advanced military posts and involvement in governmental affairs. The Baha’i community’s loyalty to the Shah was complete, and they enjoyed a wide a variety of governmental positions.

(Iran, Israel, and the “Shi’ite Crescent” Authors: Uzi Rabi and Ronen A. Cohen, November, 2008)

https://israel.fes.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Iran_Israel_Shiite_Crescent_engl.pdf

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List of notable and influential individuals with Baha'i heritage in Pahlavi-era Iran

1. General Dr. 'Abd al-Karim Ayadi: The Shah’s personal physician, chief of staff, and head of the army's Health Office.
2. General Asad Allah Sani'i: Former Minister of War and Head of the Shah’s Office while he was Crown Prince.
3. General 'Ali Muhammad Khadimi: Head of Iran’s national airline, HOMA.
4. Colonel Husayn Vahdat-i Haqq: A military engineer and polyglot who served as a military attaché in Germany.
5. Habib Allah Sabit: An industrialist and entrepreneur who introduced television to Iran.
6. Dr. Manuchihr Sharif al-Attiba (Manshadi): A physician and resident at Pahlavi University.
7. Huzhabr Yazdani: An affluent businessman and tycoon known for donating to Baha'i causes.
8. Mansour Rouhani: Minister of Water and Power, and later Agriculture; he had a Baha'i father but did not register as a Baha'i himself.
9. Dr. Sulayman Birjis: A prominent physician based in Kashan.
10. Abbas Shahidzadah: A successful engineer.
11. Sifat Allah Fahandizh: An officer in the Iranian Army.
12. Amir 'Abbas Hoveyda: The long-serving Prime Minister of Iran, who was raised Muslim despite having a Baha'i grandfather.
13. Parviz Sabiti: Second in command of SAVAK, born to Baha'i parents but later identifying as non-religious.
14. Mahnaz Afkhami: A government minister who had one Baha'i parent but did not identify as a Baha'i herself.
15. Shapour Rasekh: An advisor to the Shah and member of several Baha'i National Spiritual Assemblies.
16. Farrokhroo Parsa: Daughter of Afaq Parsa, who was a prominent Baha'i educator and feminist. Farrokhroo Parsa became the first female cabinet minister in Iran, serving as the Minister of Education. She was a Muslim.

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Iranian National Plan

He [Mas’ud Khamsi] once was a Director of the first television station in Iran established by Mr Sabet, his brother-in-law. Within the Bahá’í environment he was actively occupied with others gaining the goals of Shoghi Effendi’s first 45-month Iranian National Plan which consisted of the consolidation of all Bahá’í local communities, the reestablishment of 62 dissolved Spiritual Assembles, the formation of 22 new groups and the creation of 13 new centres throughout Iran.

(The Khamsis: A Cradle of True Gold by Boris Handal)

https://bahai-library.com/pdf/h/handal_khamsis_cradle_gold.pdf

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Baha'i villages in Iran

Sayyid Nasru’llah Khan Báqirof owned a group of six or seven villages south of Tehran in the area known as Ghar. These included Hasanabad (pop. 380 in 1951), Ja’farabad (5 km southwest of Rayy on the main Tehran to Qumm road, pop. 20 in 1951) and ‘Alíyabad (9 km south of Rayy, 1 km west of the Tehran to Qumm road, pop. 150 in 1951). A former resident of Báqirabad states that in 1950s Báqirabad consisted of a population of 110, of whom 65 were Bahá’ís. From about 1910 Báqirof encouraged Bahá’í villagers to move to these villages, especially from the villages of the Kashan area, which was being ravaged by Na’ib Husayn Kashani and the Sultanabad area. They farmed the area, growing grains and sugar beet and herding livestock. In 1918 ‘Abbas Mahmúdi moved to these villages and began to teach the Bahá’í children there. The Bahá’í villagers often talked about the Bahá’í Faith with the Muslims in these villages and in the surrounding villages such as Sayyid-abad, Khalazir (6 km northwest of Rayy, pop. 395 in 1951) and Pala’in (8 km west of Rayy, pop. 176 in 1951). Among those who tried to spread the Bahá’í Faith in this way were Mírzá Husayn Jawshqani Masiha’i and his son Mírzá Amanu’llah Mudir Masiha’i; Mírzá Hatim Khan (of Ahl-Haqq origin), the clerk at the mill in Hasanabad; Ustad Habibu’llah Vadqani, the master miller; and Haji Ulya. These individuals would invite those Muslims who showed interest to meetings at which ‘Abbas Mahmúdi spoke.

(The Khamsis: A Cradle of True Gold by Boris Handal)

https://bahai-library.com/pdf/h/handal_khamsis_cradle_gold.pdf

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Baha'i efforts to punish Iran

UHJ asks Baha'is to identify companies, in their countries, interested in doing Business with Iran.

https://archive.org/details/UHJ_LETTERS/2%20May%202016%20UHJ%20letter%20Doing%20Business%20With%20Iran/

UHJ asks Offices of External Affairs (in different countries) to contact government officials / business people visiting Iran.

https://archive.org/details/UHJ_LETTERS/5%20february%202016%20UHJ%20letter%20speaking%20with%20officials%20travelling%20to%20Iran/

UHJ asks Baha'is to lobby against Iran through their Offices of External Affairs, to meet with their government contacts, non-governmental organizations and individuals of influence.

https://archive.org/details/UHJ_LETTERS/24May2016LobbyingAgainstIran/

NSA of the US asks Baha'is across the country to join in a congressional "call-in"... to ensure that House Resolution 220 passes with the same strong bipartisan support.

https://archive.org/details/UHJ_LETTERS/20160502NsaOnMay13CongressionalCall-inCampaign/

Baha'i Comedian Omid Djalili speaks about "change" in Iran

https://youtu.be/os5kzKlqer8

Israeli Channel 12 interviews a Baha'i woman

https://www.reddit.com/r/exbahai/comments/1lowhw1/israeli_channel_12_interviews_a_bahai_woman/

18 Year old Baha'i, Borna Dehghani, takes part in anti-government protests in Iran, loses his life.

https://www.instagram.com/p/DTid3BXkdee/?igsh=MWc4ajM5ZjhpZm9mOQ==

But Baha'i Administration warns Hamid Taheri for being in contact with a Muslim from Iran.

https://taherifiles.blogspot.com/2009/09/april-2002-letter-of-australian-nsa.html

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Shirkat-i Umana affair

When Shoghi Effendi, passed away in 1957 without a will or a successor, it caused a major crisis regarding his massive estate in Iran, valued at nearly $287 million. A conflict arose between Baha'i religious rules, which stated the property belonged to the faith, and Iranian civil law, which stated it belonged to Shoghi's relatives. This was complicated because Shoghi had previously excommunicated his siblings, labeling them as covenant-breakers and enemies of the faith. To prevent losing total control of the assets, the Baha'i leadership made a controversial decision to negotiate with these relatives and pay them a significant portion of the fortune. This move upset many followers, who viewed it as a hypocritical betrayal of Shoghi's own decrees to strictly avoid those family members.

To secure the remaining assets, the leadership established a corporation known as the Umana Company. According to a legal complaint filed by Colonel Yadu'llah Thabet Rasekh, a former member of the community, this company was actually a tool used to commit fraud and evade millions of dollars in taxes. Baha'i leaders (Hands of the Cause) illegally transferred the property titles to a specific individual and then to the company to hide the real value of the land. These actions were not only illegal under Iranian law but also a violation of Baha'i principles.

For more details check:

https://historydocuments.ir/?page=post&id=3077

https://bahaism.blogspot.com/2025/12/what-happened-to-shoghi-effendis-vast.html

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